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ABSTRACT
The Dynamic Source Routing protocol for ad hoc networks
is one of the leading candidates for adoption by the IETF
amongst the class of reactive routing protocols. The cur-
rently deﬁned protocol assumes total node cooperation, which
allows attacks by failed or malicious nodes whose behaviour
violates the protocol rules. Failed nodes will typically fail to
forward information; badly failed nodes will inadvertently
introduce false routing messages; selﬁsh nodes deliberately
refuse to forward packets; ﬁnally, malicious nodes may dis-
rupt the network in any possible way. There have been
many proposals for securing DSR, most of which introduce
major overheads and hence make the protocol less attrac-
tive. This paper takes a somewhat diﬀerent approach and
presents some simple techniques aimed at making the pro-
tocol more robust with minimal overhead
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1. INTRODUCTION
Mobile ad hoc networks have existed since the 1950s, with
the inception of the DARPA packet radio network [4]. Since
then, like many other technologies, their use has been re-
stricted to military scenarios, but recently the realisation
of the potential for commercial use has grown. In parallel
with this, research into the security of mobile ad hoc net-
works has recently mushroomed, resulting in the publication
of many papers on the subject [1, 5, 6]. This particular pa-
per concentrates on the proposed Dynamic Source Routing
(DSR) protocol [2], and in particular on the version deﬁned
in the latest draft being considered by the Internet Engineer-
ing Task Force (IETF)1 [3]. However, rather than introduce
any new security mechanisms which will operate above or
below the network layer, the ideas given are simple tech-
niques which can be applied to the implementation of DSR
to make it more robust against the inherent vulnerabilities
of mobile ad hoc networks. Some of these vulnerabilities
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funding support, including that of EPSRC, is gratefully ac-
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exist because of the assumption that there will be total co-
operation amongst the mobile nodes.
Section 2 introduces the terminology used in this paper.
Section 3 gives an overview of DSR routing. Section 4 de-
scribes a threat model for mobile ad hoc networks, used
throughout the rest of the paper. Section 5 will focus on
certain parts of the routing protocol, and describes what
can be modiﬁed to eliminate speciﬁc vulnerabilities. Note
that this paper is concerned only with the security of the
routing protocol, and not with the many other security is-
sues that can arise in mobile ad hoc networks.
2. TERMINOLOGY
The following terms are used in this document, but may
be used diﬀerently elsewhere. A node is a device which has
a network interface participating in routing in a mobile ad
hoc network. It may or may not be mobile, and may also
be part of another network. It is important to realise that
a node can actually be a large network, or it could just be
a single mobile device such as a mobile phone. An origi-
nator node is a node which originates a DSR data packet,
intended for a certain destination node. A node is a neigh-
bour node of another node if it is only one hop away and
within direct transmission range. If the destination node is
not a neighbour node of the originator node, the data packet
will have to traverse a multi-hop route consisting of inter-
mediate nodes. In a speciﬁc scenario, the sending node is
the last node to have forwarded the data packet.
In DSR, a data packet can contain several headers of dif-
ferent types. Route Request packets are generated and sent
whenever a node wishes to send packets to a certain desti-
nation node but does not have an up-to-date route. Route
Reply packets are sent in response to Route Requests, by
either an intermediate node or the destination node itself.
Route Errors are generated and sent whenever a node fails
to forward a packet because of a link break. Thus, Route
Error messages contain details of the location of the link
break. See Section 3 for details of how these DSR header
options are used.
Most data packets in DSR contain a Source route/Route
record. This is a sequential list of node addresses from the
originator node to the destination node, and is used to de-
liver data packets from the listed originator node to the
listed destination node. In the context of sending data pack-
ets along a route, the Forward Path is the (downstream)
route from originator node to destination node. Conversely,
the Reverse Path is the (upstream) route from the destina-
tion to originator node. Finally, so that DSR can interface
with other routing protocols or, indeed, another DSR ad
hoc network, allowing scalability, DSR identiﬁes links with
‘other’ networks as External links. An external link is only
permitted to be the last hop in a Source Route.
3. DSR PROTOCOL OVERVIEW
The DSR protocol is a distance-vector protocol for ad hoc
networks [2], where all nodes participate in a distributed
routing process. The ad hoc network consists of a collec-
tion of mobile nodes, where each node participating in DSR
maintains a number of data structures fundamental to the
running of DSR. This paper does not provide a complete
description of DSR, but only describes the parts of the pro-
tocol which are necessary to understand the proposed modi-
ﬁcations. Section 3.1 describes how data packets are routed
through a DSR controlled mobile ad hoc network. Section
3.2 describes the route discovery cycle, before section 3.3
describes route maintenance.
Two key data structures that a node participating in DSR
must correctly maintain, and that are relevant to this paper,
are the route cache and the gratuitous Route Reply table.
The route cache is where all route information is stored by a
node. New information added to the route cache is extracted
from both received DSR packets containing route control in-
formation, and from overheard packets being sent to other
nodes. Route information is only removed from the route
cache upon receiving a DSR packet with Route Error in-
formation. When new information is added, the node must
check to see if there are any packets which can be immedi-
ately sent as a result of this new information. The gratuitous
Route Reply table is used to record any gratuitous Route
Replies sent by the node. This process is described in more
detail in Section 3.2.
3.1 Processing DSR Data Packets
When a node wishes to send a data packet it will ﬁrst
search its route cache for a route to the destination IP ad-
dress. If there is more than one route then one will need to
be selected. If the destination is more than one hop away,
a source route is added to the data packet containing the
chosen route. The data packet is then transmitted to the
ﬁrst-hop node.
When a node receives a DSR data packet with a source
route, the node will add the source route to its cache, sub-
ject to the Medium Access Control (MAC) layer protocol
conditions2.
If the node is the target of the data packet then it can
pass the packet contents to the network layer for processing.
If the node is not the target then it should perform route
maintenance (see Section 3.3) to check if the speciﬁed next-
hop in the source route is a reachable node. If the neighbour
node is reachable, the node removes the ﬁrst address in the
data packet’s source route and transmits the data packet to
the next-hop.
3.2 Route Discovery
Route discovery is initiated when a node originates a data
packet for transmission, and ﬁnds that it has no source route
for the destination of the packet. The node will create and
2Whether or not the source route is added to the route cache
will depend on whether the MAC layer protocol allows uni-
directional links or not.
broadcast a Route Request. The Route Request will con-
tain a unique identiﬁcation value, the originator node’s IP
address, the destination node’s IP address, and a source
route. The initial source route only contains the originator
node’s IP address.
The Route Request will be discarded by nodes if it is a du-
plicate, or if the node’s address is already in the source route
(to prevent loops). If the receiving node is not the destina-
tion or does not know of a route to the requested destination,
the node adds an entry into its recent Route Request cache
and creates a copy of the Route Request, appending its own
IP address to the source route, before broadcasting the new
Route Request after a random BroadcastJitter delay.
Route Replies containing a source route to the requested
destination node must be sent by the destination node, and
intermediate nodes with a route to the destination stored in
their route caches. Every Route Reply uses the same iden-
tiﬁcation value as the corresponding Route Request so that
it can be identiﬁed when it is received. When the originator
node receives the Route Reply, it adds the source route to
its route cache and then checks if it has any packets to send
using the new information.
3.2.1 Automatic Route Shortening
An intermediate node may operate in promiscuous mode
and overhear packets, in which case it should check to see
if automatic route shortening is possible. This is possible if
the node’s own address appears in the unexpended portion
of the source route [2, p152].
If this situation occurs, the addresses in the source route
between that of the overheard node and the intermediate
node itself are redundant and can be removed (see Figure 1).
The intermediate node needs to check its gratuitous Route
Reply table to see if it has received a gratuitous Route Reply
from either the source node of the data packet, or the node
which was overheard forwarding the packet. No further ac-
tion should be taken if a reply has been received. Otherwise
an entry is created in the gratuitous Route Reply table for
this data packet, and a gratuitous Route Reply containing
the shorter route should be sent to the originating node. If
bi-directional communication is needed because of the MAC
protocol, the gratuitous Route Reply’s source route should
be the reverse of the source route of the overheard data
packet. A listening node may factor in other issues such as
signal-noise ratio before determining that it can rationally
be part of the shorter route.
3.3 Route maintenance
As mentioned previously, a node must perform route main-
tenance before forwarding a data packet. The preceding
node is responsible for conﬁrming that the next-hop node is
reachable. There are three methods of acknowledging that
the link is okay and these methods, in order of priority, are
link layer acknowledgements, passive acknowledgements and
network layer acknowledgements. This paper only proposes
enhancements to the passive acknowledgement mechanism
— see [2] for further information about the other two.
3.3.1 Passive Acknowledgements
Passive acknowledgments have second priority and are
used when nodes’ network interfaces can operate in promis-
cuous mode, with the majority of network links bi-directional.
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Figure 1: An example of how automatic route short-
ening can work. In the figure, the source route
is SABCEFD. Node F overhears node B sending a
packet with source route CEFD. Node F can now
send a gratuitous Route Reply to S, telling it to use
the shorter source route SABFD.
the next-hop to forward this packet. The node then checks
that the data packets match, and that the source route of the
forward packet is shorter than the source route of the packet
that the node received. If both checks are positive then the
next-hop has performed the passive acknowledgement. This
cannot be used for the last hop of a data packet as there will
be no transmission to use as a passive acknowledgement.
3.3.2 Processing Route Error data packets
When a node veriﬁes that the next-hop for a data packet
x is unreachable, the node needs to create a Route Error
containing: a NODE UNREACHABLE option, the IP ad-
dress of the next-hop node that is unreachable, and the IP
address of the source of the Route Error (i.e. the node’s
own address). The Route Error is then transmitted to every
node which has sent a packet through a route which uses
the broken link.
When a node receives a Route Error, it must delete all
routes in its route cache which use the broken link, i.e. the
link from the source of the Route Error to the unreach-
able node speciﬁed in the Route Error. Which data packets
should be retransmitted is the decision of the upper layers,
which may use another route in the route cache, or initiate a
new route discovery procedure for the aﬀected destination.
However, there should be a limit on the number of times that
a new route discovery should be used for that destination.
Also, to increase the spread of the Route Error information,
any subsequent Route Requests for the aﬀected destination
may be piggybacked with the Route Error header. This
enables nodes to ignore Route Replies which contain the
broken link.
3.3.3 Salvaging a packet
If the intermediate node has detected a link break but has
an alternative route to the destination of the data packet,
the node can salvage the packet up to an n number of times.
[2, p151].
To salvage a data packet x, the intermediate node ﬁrst
sends a data packet containing a Route Error option back to
the originator of x, as described above. The node should now
copy the new alternative source route into the data packet
being salvaged, and the salvage ﬁeld should be incremented.
The salvaged packet can then be forwarded and transmitted
as in Section 3.1.
4. AD HOC NETWORK THREAT MODEL
The threat model used here distinguishes between exter-
nal and internal attacks — see also [6, p.25]. External
attacks are performed by unauthorised nodes or entities.
These threats are likely to be more easily detected than
threats from internal nodes. Internal attacks are conducted
by internal nodes, i.e. authorised nodes within the ad hoc
network, and are thus likely to be more diﬃcult to detect,
as they arise from trusted sources.
In the text below, ‘correct’ data packets and ‘correct’ pro-
cedures are simply those that adhere strictly to the DSR
routing protocol being used. By contrast ‘incorrect’ data
packets and ‘incorrect’ procedures are those which are in
any way diﬀerent to the format and behaviour as stated in
the protocol. ‘False’ data packets are data packets that are
of the correct protocol format, but contain false information.
4.1 External Threats
The main external threats posed to a mobile ad hoc net-
work routing protocol are as follows:
• Unauthorised reading of routing information,
• Unauthorised modiﬁcation of routing information,
• Preventing the routing protocol from functioning, and
• Masquerading as an authorised node.
The external threats exist because of the inherently lim-
ited physical security of mobile ad hoc networks. The wire-
less communications medium makes it easier to intercept
communications and inject messages than in an equivalent
wired network. Hence, an ad hoc network is very vulnera-
ble to attacks where an external attacker masquerades as a
trusted node to perform internal attacks (see below). The
need for light-weight, highly mobile devices means that the
physical security of the device itself may also be limited,
allowing the device to be easily compromised.
4.2 Internal Threats
The threats posed by internal nodes are very serious, as
internal nodes will have the necessary information to partic-
ipate in the routing protocol. Internal nodes can misbehave
in a variety of diﬀerent ways; we identify four categories of
misbehaviour, as follows:
• Failed nodes,
• Badly failed nodes,
• Selﬁsh nodes, and
• Malicious nodes.
Failed nodes are simply those unable to perform a route
operation; this could be for many reasons, including power
failure and environmental events. The main issues with
failed nodes of this type are failing to update data struc-
tures, or the failure to send or forward data packets, in-
cluding those with DSR route header options. The threat of
having failed nodes is most serious if failed nodes are needed
as part of an emergency route, or form part of a secure route.
Badly failed nodes exhibit features of failed nodes such as
not sending or forwarding data packets or route messages.
In addition they can also send false routing messages, which
are still correctly formatted, but which contain false infor-
mation and are a threat to the integrity of the network. For
example, false Route Requests for a node which does not
exist may circulate in the ad hoc network using up valuable
bandwidth, as no node can provide a suitable reply. Unnec-
essary Route Requests, for routes which badly failed nodes
already have, might also be sent. False Route Replies in
response to a true Route Request may result in false routes
being set up and propagated through the network. False
Route Error messages will cause working links to be marked
as broken, potentially initiating a route maintenance proce-
dure.
Selﬁsh nodes exploit the routing protocol to their own
advantage, e.g. to enhance performance or save resources.
Selﬁsh nodes are typiﬁed by their unwillingness to cooperate
as the protocol requires whenever a personal cost is involved,
and will exhibit the same behaviours as failed nodes, de-
pending on which operations they decide not to perform. It
is important to emphasise that, in this model, selﬁsh nodes
do not perform any action to compromise network integrity
by actively introducing incorrect information.
Finally, malicious nodes deliberately disrupt the operation
of the routing protocol in some way, i.e. denying network
services to other nodes. Hence, they may display any of the
behaviours shown by the other types of failed nodes. The
impact of a malicious node’s actions are greatly increased if
it is the only link between groups of neighbouring nodes.
Note that two failed nodes within the same category may
exhibit diﬀerent degrees of failed node behaviour. For ex-
ample, some nodes will be more selﬁsh than others. Also,
a node may demonstrate behaviours from more than one
category — indeed, this may even be the typical case.
5. PROTOCOL MODIFICATIONS
Simple techniques are now described which can be used to
enhance the robustness of DSR, alleviating certain attacks
described in the threat model.
5.1 Source Route Verification
The currently deﬁned version of the protocol only requires
a node performing passive acknowledgements to check the
source route header ‘Segments Left’ ﬁeld, to passively verify
that the data packet has been forwarded with the correct
source route [3, p59]. Passive acknowledgement is achieved
if the value of the ‘Segments left’ ﬁeld, in the forwarded data
packet, is smaller than the value in the original data packet
which was sent to the neighbour. The obvious attack here is
misdirection, where a malicious node can forward the data
packet with a shorter but incorrect source route.
One solution to this would be to add a check of the source
route in the packet being forwarded by the neighbour. Only
if the source routes match (apart from the last address which
will have been removed by the neighbour node performing
the forwarding) is the passive acknowledgement deemed to
have succeeded. Note that this check can only be performed
using passive acknowledgements, and that the misdirection
attack is still possible when using the other two acknowledg-
ment methods (see Section 3.3).
5.2 Route Request Verification
Another means of source route veriﬁcation is during route
discovery, as also used in [5]. As no acknowledgement system
is used, a badly failed node forwarding a Route Request can
simply add spurious addresses to the source route without
detection. A check by the neighbour nodes which receive
this incorrect Route Request can be made, to see if the last
address of the source route corresponds to the address of the
node from which it was received, i.e. if the Route Request
was received from node x then the recipient should check
that the address of x is the last address in the source route.
However, what this approach will not detect is the sce-
nario where a malicious or badly failed node adds diﬀerent
addresses, ending with its own address as the last address in
the source route. The node will have thus injected a route
which will divert traﬃc, before ﬁnally travelling to the in-
tended destination. Indeed, a malicious node may make use
of multiple network interfaces [3, p66] to create an unde-
tectable loop. Therefore this technique is only useful for
detecting badly failed nodes, who are more likely to add
spurious addresses than malicious nodes.
5.3 LimitingDenial of ServiceAttacks that ex-
ploit Route Error Messages
Route Error messages are a potential source of denial of
service attacks from malicious nodes. False Route Error
messages can easily be propagated throughout the network,
falsely indicating that certain links are broken. A method
to partially mitigate this threat is to include a unique iden-
tiﬁer with every data packet sent. Any Route Error message
should then contain the unique identiﬁer of the data packet
which triggered the Route Error message. It is likely that a
node which has sent the data packet will receive the corre-
sponding Route Error message in the event of the link break,
because it was part of the source route. Hence, any nodes
which overhear or receive a Route Error message should
check that it contains a unique identiﬁer corresponding to
a data packet it has forwarded, before accepting the Route
Error message as true. A side-eﬀect is that every node has
to store the unique identiﬁers of each data packet it has
forwarded, for a certain period of time.
Another possible check is whether or not the address of
the node which has detected the break was actually part of
the source route. This does impose the overhead that the
source route used by every data packet forwarded must be
stored, which may result in a serious loss of valuable storage
space.
These techniques limit the scope of any false Route Error
message attack. Malicious nodes can now only send false
error messages using the unique identiﬁer of a data packet
that has already been sent, and then only the nodes which
have already forwarded the data packet will believe the false
Route Error message.
5.4 Improving Automatic Route Shortening
The mobile nature of devices in an ad hoc network leads
to solutions with varying optimisations to cope with the fact
that parts of routes may break at any time. The following
scenario reduces the eﬀectiveness of automatic route short-
ening (see Section 3.2). Consider the chain of events shown
in Figure 2, where a node later in a source route moves
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Figure 2: In diagram 1, node S originates and trans-
mits a data packet with source route ‘SABCEFD’.
In diagram 2, when node B receives the data packet,
nodes F and D move so that node F is now in
transmission range of nodes B and C. Node B for-
wards the data packet to node C with source route
‘CEFD’. Following the automatic route shortening
procedure, node F overhears the data packet and
sees that its address occurs later on in the source
route. It then sends a gratuitous Route Reply to
node S, if it has not done so before. Node S now
has a shorter source route to node D, i.e. ‘SABFD’.
However, a problem arises if node F moves out of
the transmission range of node B, since the route
contained in the gratuitous reply is now false. In-
deed, node F could move back to a position where
the old route is now valid, as in diagram 3.
A possible solution is to maintain a table of received gra-
tuitous Route Replies, and only accept a source route given
in a gratuitous Route Reply if it has been received a certain
number of times t say. The value of t can be made a dynamic
variable which can be adjusted according to the mobility of
the nodes in the network, where a highly changing network
will need a higher value before a route can be accepted as
stable.
5.5 Improving Salvaging
Recall that this is the process of forwarding a data packet
along an alternative route, if the original source route is
broken (Section 3.3). If the alternative route is also bro-
ken, then this optimisation actually becomes a burden on
the node performing salvaging. This can be exploited by
malicious nodes to perform a serious denial of service at-
tack. A malicious node can inject a large number of false
routes pointing to a destination which does not exist. The
malicious node could then send a data packet addressed for
the false destination, and let nodes who have stored the false
routes in their route caches waste resources trying to salvage
the packets using alternative routes.
To reduce this threat, a node should only salvage a packet
using an alternative route which has used before. This
means that a node must have successfully originated or for-
warded a data packet along the route whilst receiving no
Route Error message. Again, the number of times a route
has been successfully used can be a dynamic variable which a
node can adjust, depending on how stable a route the node
wants, i.e. the higher the number, the more the node can
trust that the route will not break while it is being used.
5.6 Other suggestions
One of the properties of ad hoc networks is their inherent
redundancy, leading to multiple paths to certain destina-
tions. The protocol speciﬁcation does not specify how a
node with multiple routes to the same destination should
select which route to use. In order to increase the proba-
bility that a data packet will reach its destination, the node
could send copies of the data packet along several routes,
preferably along routes which do not use the same nodes. If
IP addressing, and therefore IP headers, are not used, then
some unique identiﬁcation value will need to be included.
This enables copies of data packets to be discarded. There
will of course be a trade-oﬀ, as using multiple routes will
result in more bandwidth being used.
DSR allows the possibility of creating network hierarchies
[3, p17,37]. Not only does this make the protocol more scal-
able, but utilising this feature also helps enhance security in
various ways. In the operation of DSR, external addresses
(addresses of nodes not within the ‘group’) are only per-
mitted to be the ﬁnal address in a source route. This con-
strains internal route information within a group. Therefore
any false or incorrect routing information is also contained
within the group, and does not aﬀect the rest of the network.
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